Contracts - Pre-Existing Legal Duty - Louisiana Law by Bullock, Geraldine E.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 13 | Number 4
May 1953
Contracts - Pre-Existing Legal Duty - Louisiana
Law
Geraldine E. Bullock
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Geraldine E. Bullock, Contracts - Pre-Existing Legal Duty - Louisiana Law, 13 La. L. Rev. (1953)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol13/iss4/8
NOTES
In Washington, Arizona, Nevada and Texas the division of
the community is left to the discretion of the court.1 2 The Texas
statute concerning alimony pendente lite is most similar to ours,
for it is proportioned to the wife's needs and the husband's
means.' 3 But even in that state the results reached may differ
substantially from ours, for Texas spouses may dissolve the com-
munity at will by mutual agreement.' 4
Thus it is seen that the statutes and jurisprudence of other
community property states shed very little light upon the problem
in Louisiana. The major reason for this is the unique stand taken
in Louisiana, as opposed to the other states, that the spouses have
a very definite vested interest in the community assets. Other
states either do not have such a vested interest by the spouses or
such interest is indefinite and may be changed by the court
depending upon the circumstances.' 5 It is believed, therefore,
that the solution to the problem lies wholly in a more compete
analysis of Article 148 and in a re-examination of prior juris-
prudence.
Maynard E. Cush
CONTRACTS-PRE-EXISTING LEGAL DUTY-LOUISIANA LAW
Plaintiff, under a verbal contract of employment, sought to
recover from defendant the value of his services for the demoli-
tion and removal of a "steel reenforced" concrete foundation of
a diesel engine in defendant's plant. The day after work was
begun on the removal of the foundation, the plaintiff informed
the defendant that he could not afford to work any longer under
the original contract, for it had not been contemplated that the
concrete would be "full of iron." Another contract was executed
at that time whereby the plaintiff agreed to carry on the work
until Tuesday morning, meaning the second day after that on
12. However, in some states the court may not only (1) award the hus-
band's entire share of community assets to the wife, but also (2) may order
some of the husband's separate assets to be paid over to her. As to (1)
above, see N.M. Stat. 1941, § 25-716. Cf. Harper v. Harper, 54 N.M. 194,
217 P. 2d 857 (1950). In this case the court called the award of assets "lump-
sum alimony." As to (2) above, see Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. 1932,
§ 26.08.110. Cf. Hale v. Hale, 76 Wash. 34, 135 Pac. 481 (1931).
13. Vernon's Tex. Stat. 1948, Art. 4637.
14. Id. at Art. 4624a.
15. The rights of both parties depend on the discretion of the court. Thus
the court's only restraint is its own sense of justice. See notes 12 and 13,
supra.
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which the conversation took place, and the defendant agreed to
pay plaintiff an additional $100. When an inquiry was made by
the plaintiff as to the continuance of the work after Tuesday, the
defendant then said: "I don't care what it will cost, get it out."
The plaintiff completed the work and sued the defendant for
compensation. In rendering the decision, the court upheld the
modified or new promise on the ground that it constituted a
good faith setlement of a substantial dispute between the parties
as to the effect or construction of the original contract. Lee v.
National Cylinder Gas Company, 58 So. 2d 568 (La. 1952).
Achieving the result under the theory that the modified
agreement was a settlement or compromise of existing differences
between the parties is neither questionable nor unique. In
numerous decisions when a dispute has developed over the
original contract, the subsequent promise has been considered a
"compromise of differences" and judgment rendered for the
plaintiff.1 Nevertheless, the court in the instant case, as in pre-
vious decisions rendered under this theory,2 approved, or at
least recognized, the rule stated in Monroe Investment Company
v. Ford . The rule of the Ford case had been directly extracted
from the common law doctrine set forth in Corpus Juris:
"A promise to do what the promisor is already bound to
do cannot be a consideration, for, if a person gets nothing in
return for his promise but that to which he is already legally
entitled, the consideration is unreal. Therefore, as a general
rule, the performance of, or promise to perform, an existing
legal obligation is not a valid consideration. ' 4
The Louisiana courts, although often reaching a satisfactory
result by application of this common law concept of considera-
tion, have neglected to use the civilian concept of cause, which
in many instances would have facilitated the rendering of deci-
sions. While one cannot bind himself in the common law unless
he receives something in return for his promise to be bound,'
the civil law doctrine of cause exalts the individual will and pro-
1. Moorman v. Plummer Lumber Co., 113 La. 429, 37 So. 17 (1904);
Standard Electric Construction Co. v. Frick Co., Inc., 16 La. App. 331, 134 So.
322 (1931); Breard v. Pyramid Oil and Gas Co., Inc., 191 La. 420, 185 So. 303
(1938).
2. Standard Electric Construction Co. v. Frick Co., Inc., 16 La. App. 331,
134 So. 322 (1931); Breard v. Pyramid Oil and Gas Co., Inc., 191 La. 420, 185
So. 303 (1938).
3. 168 La. 475, 122 So. 586 (1929).
4. 13 C.3., Contracts 351, § 207 (1917).
5. Restatement, Contracts § 75 (1932).
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vides that the promisor can bind himself merely by expressing
a will to do so.6 Thus, had the Louisiana courts followed this
civilian principle, the decision would hinge around the question
of fact: Was the promisor's new promise given because of duress
or coercion, or was it voluntarily given? In those situations in
which the new promise is practically extorted, a real will to bind
is lacking and no contract results. In cases where the new prom-
ise is voluntarily given, the will to bind exists and results in a
contract.
The great exponents of the civil law in France have accorded
this theory full recognition. There is substantial agreement that
a promise to do more than one is legally bound to do may be
based on an invalid cause. Pothier, Aubry and Rau, and Baudry-
Lacantinerie suggest that the promise has an illicit cause when
it is the debtor who exacts the promise in return for doing what
he is already obligated to do.7 Demolombe disregarded the con-
cept of illicit cause but achieved the same result on the notion
that the obligation is invalid under Article 1133 of the French
Civil Code.8 A study of the Louisiana jurisprudence makes it
apparent, however, that the Louisiana courts have either failed
to consider this treatment of the question or have not thought it
to be the proper way of solving the issue.
There is another approach which excludes the use of the
doctrine of consideration and under which the courts could reach
results, in most cases, exactly corresponding to those of the com-
mon law courts? The Anglo-American opinions make it evident
that in most cases the issue of enforceability actually turns on
the good or bad faith of the parties. The cases manifest a ten-
dency to apply the principle strictly when the circumstances
show that the new promise was not voluntarily made, but given
because of duress or coercion.' On the other hand, the courts
often make an exception in cases where the new promise was
6. Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 2, 4
(1951).
7. 4 Aubry et Rau, Cour de Droit Civil Frangais 550 (5 ed. 1902); 2
Baudry-Lacantinerie, Pr6cis de Droit Civil, no 124 (13 ed. 1925); 1 Pothier,
Obligations 126, no 46 (Evans, 1853); Snellings, Cause and Consideration in
Louisiana, 8 Tulane L. Rev. 178, 200 (1933).
8. 1 Demolombe, Cours de Code Napoleon XXIV, Trait6 des Contrats, no
380 (1 ed. 1877); Snellings, Cause and Consideration in Louisiana, 8 Tulane
L. Rev. 178, 200 (1933). Note that Article 1133 of the French Civil Code corre-
sponds to Article 1895 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
9. Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 Louisiana Law Review 2, 28
(1951).
10. Davis & Co. v. Morgan, 117 Ga. 504, 43 S.E. 732 (1903); Lingenfelder v.
Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1890).
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voluntary and prompted by a recognition of the unforeseen hard-
ship involved in the performance of the original contract.1 '
Where the facts of a case are such that the court feels that the
parties have in good faith adjusted their differences, it is very
likely to make use of the argument that the new agreement is
valid for the reason that there had been a rescission of the for-
mer contract.12 It is believed that in most cases of this kind there
is lacking a solid factual basis for finding mutual cancellation
and that to rest a decision upon a rescission is to rest it upon a
fiction. Louisiana courts could, by applying Article 1901 of the
Code, which specifically provides that obligations must be per-
formed in good faith, refuse to give validity to a promise of
additional compensation except in cases where the plaintiff's
conduct is not morally blameworthy and where the new promise
was given because of some unforeseen hardship.
The language of the instant case is, however, in line with
past decisions regarding the performance of pre-existing legal
duties. The opinion of the court indicates that if necessary it
would not have hesitated to resort to the use of the common law
concept of consideration in rendering the judgment. As the juris-
prudence stands at present, a pre-existing obligation will be held
enforceable if the promise can be supported as a "compromise
of differences and not a gratuitous undertaking." If the facts of
the case will not lend themselves to a compromise situation, the
obligation will be held invalid for lack of common law con-
sideration.
Geraldine E. Bullock
LEGISLATION-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
In State v. St. Julian' the Supreme Court dealt with the
question as to which of two acts passed at the same session of
the Legislature purporting to amend the same section of the
Revised Statutes should be given effect. This problem is one
which the Supreme Court will be called upon to decide again in
the near future, because there are several other instances in
11. Linz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 67 Atl. 286 (1907); Munroe v. Perkins, 26
Mass. 298, 20 Am. Dec. 475 (1930); Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231
N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
12. Martiniello v. Bamel, 255 Mass. 25, 150 N.E. 838 (1926); Munroe v.
Perkins, 26 Mass. 298, 20 Am. Dec. 475 (1830); Schwartzreich v. Bauman-
Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
1. 221 La. 1018, 61 So. 2d 464 (1952).
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